












The paper provides an account of the working of the Low Pay Commission that was 
established to advise on the introduction of a statutory National Minimum Wage for the 
United Kingdom. It discusses the way in which the Commission was constituted and the 
consultation procedures and research methods it developed over its first four years. An 
account is provided of the principles the Commission developed and of the problems that 
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Introduction 
The National Minimum Wage was the Ugly Duckling of the 1997 Labour Government. 
The proposal had been a favourite target of Conservative attack during the election 
campaign, with blood-chilling predictions of its unemployment implications. The Labour 
leadership’s response had been nervously defensive. The commitment to a statutory 
minimum wage had been forced on them by Party Conference and it threatened to 
undermine their prime objectives of winning business confidence and reducing 
unemployment. But by the 2001 election all this had changed. What was once seen as a 
risky concession to Old Labour was being presented as a major achievement of New 
Labour’s first government. It was, furthermore, an innovation to which the Conservative 
Party had been converted. 
 
The task of turning this awkward pledge into a workable policy was given to a new body, 
the Low Pay Commission. This account describes how the Commission set about its 
work, and how it tackled the issues that emerged. It deals with the design of the National 
Minimum Wage, its introduction, and the monitoring of its initial impact up to the 2001 
General Election, by which time the Wage could be considered soundly established. An  
official account of its work is to be found in the Commission’s first three reports (LPC, 
1998; 2000a; 2001a,b). The present paper is a personal, Commissioner’s eye view of the 
process, comparable with earlier accounts by Bain (1999) and Metcalf (1999a; 1999b) 
but taking it over a longer period.  
 
The Nature of the Commission 
The Low Pay Commission was established in July 1997, within three months of Labour’s 
election. It was one of the first bodies set up under the Nolan Committee’s principles 
requiring open advertisement and independent assessors. Important to its later 
 4
functioning was its relatively small size of just nine Commissioners, balanced between 
three people with a trade union background, three with an employer background, and 
three academic labour relations specialists. The trade union members consisted of the 
General Secretary of the clothing union KFAT, the Chief Economist (replaced, when he 
became Chair of the Health and Safety Commission, by the Head of Economic and Social 
Affairs) of the Trades Union Congress, and a member of the union UNISON’s Executive 
(replaced, when she became Chair of ACAS, by the Deputy General Secretary of the 
union TGWU). The employer members were the Human Resources Director of a major 
hotel and catering group, the Human Resources Policy Director (later promoted to 
Deputy Director-General) of the Confederation of British Industry, and the Chief 
Executive of a retailers’ federation (replaced on retirement by the Chief Executive of a 
bakers’ federation). The Commission Chair was one of the academics, George Bain, then 
Vice Chancellor of Queen’s University, Belfast, and previously Principal of the London 
Business School, with considerable experience as an arbitrator. 
 
The Commission’s task was to make recommendations on the Minimum Wage to 
Government. For these to have credibility it was important that they should have 
legitimacy in the eyes of both organised labour and employers. The Commissioners were, 
and perceived themselves to be, engaged in an exercise in social partnership. This meant 
that the TUC and CBI were consulted on their appointment. But each Commissioner 
served as an individual, without mandate or requirement to report back. They were also 
self-consciously independent of Government, which was reflected in a robust collective 
resistance to any whiff of political pressure. In practice they rarely divided on simple 
interest-related lines. For example, some of the toughest questioning of the views of 
small business people came from the Commissioners from just that background. Indeed, 
of the many issues on which the Commission was required to reach agreement, only two 
created a clear split between employers and trade unionists. The first of these was the 
question of whether there should be a separate rate for young people, to which we shall 
return. The second was the predictable issue of the actual level of the Wage, and of the 
size of its subsequent uprating. On these occasions the Chair mediated, over the course of 
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a couple of days of meetings and side-meetings, a fairly conventional, if unusually well-
informed, bargain. 
 
Supporting the Commission was a strong secretariat that varied between about ten and 
twenty people according to need. Although situated in the Department of Trade and 
Industry, it drew its specialists on training, social security, statistics and so on from other 
relevant departments. Their tasks covered gathering and processing evidence, arranging 
consultative visits and hearings, conducting surveys and statistical and economic 
analyses, and drafting the Commission’s bulky reports. They also managed what was to 
become a large programme of commissioned research. 
 
Another substantial support for the Commission was the National Minimum Wage Act, 
passed in 1998. This was a strong measure, reflecting the long-standing commitment to 
the National Minimum Wage of Ian McCartney, the Government minister who steered it 
through Parliament. Its broad definition of an eligible employee, for example, 
encompassed home-workers, agency workers, casual labourers, workers on short-term 
contracts, and many of those spuriously defined as ‘self-employed’. The Act placed the 
burden on employers to keep the necessary records to prove that they were paying the 
Wage, rather than requiring aggrieved employees to prove that they were not. As well as 
giving workers the right to recover any underpayment due to them, it provided for 
substantial penalties, with fines of up to £5000 for each offence, for refusal to pay the 
Minimum Wage, for having inadequate or inaccurate records, and for obstructing 
enforcement. The task of enforcement was later given, on the recommendation of the 
Commission, to the Inland Revenue which tackled the task with energy, imagination and 
common sense. 
 
The Government also simplified the Commission’s task by prejudging certain aspects of 
the National Minimum Wage. Particularly important was that it should be a common 
minimum across the whole UK, not subject to regional variations (as in Japan or Canada, 
for example) nor to sectoral variations (as had been the Wages Council system). If given 
the option, it is likely that the Commission would have come to the same conclusion. 
 6
Low pay is very sectorally specific, and also localised within geographical areas much 
smaller than the conventional economic regions. Furthermore those representing the more 
depressed regions were themselves wary lest the recognition of regional variations in 
living costs through regional variations in statutory minimum wages might have other 
adverse consequences, such as inferior economic status or regional variations in benefit 
entitlements.  
 
More generally, the Commission’s terms of reference studiously avoided any suggestion 
that the Minimum Wage should be set at a level to represent some sort of acceptable 
living standard. An important fiscal motivation for a statutory minimum wage was the 
fact that, without any floor to wages, ever more low-paid employees with families were 
becoming entitled to means-tested in-work benefits, at ever-increasing cost to the 
Exchequer. The benefits system was in effect subsidising low-paying employers. The 
National Minimum Wage was thus an essential component in making viable the 
Government’s ambitious strategy of reforming the tax and benefit system in order to 
encourage the jobless back into work and to reduce family poverty. The question of a 
decent living standard was being addressed through the whole package around Working 
Family Tax Credits of which the National Minimum Wage was a part, and not through 
the National Minimum Wage alone. 
 
The task  
The remit of the Low Pay Commission has been to implement a single labour market 
innovation, and to maintain it indefinitely. This narrow focus but long-term responsibility 
has been important for the way in which the Commission has functioned. Unlike many 
public enquiries, the key question has not been what should be done, but how it might be 
done best. And it has not been a matter of the key interest groups having a single 
opportunity to give their points of view, but of their having recurring opportunities to do 
so, as experience develops. 
 
For these reasons, the Commission placed less emphasis than is normal on the formal 
procedures of seeking evidence and holding hearings. A great deal of initial evidence was 
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received, and hearings were held with some of the more substantial interest groups. But 
although many commented on what they considered to be an acceptable level for the 
Minimum Wage, no-one was in a position to provide hard evidence on the potential 
impact of different levels of it. Even the Government’s own formal evidence amounted 
largely to a review of published research, the most telling of which concerned findings on 
minimum wage increases in other countries. 
 
The paradox was that for this quintessentially economic question – what would be the 
impact of a minimum wage – economic analysis had no useful answer. Or rather, it 
suggested a range of answers, but not where in that range any given minimum rate might 
be appropriate. The outcomes suggested by theory were fundamental to the success of the 
project, and they covered a range of sensitive issues.  At what level would a minimum 
wage begin to cause significant job loss? How far would an increase in rates of pay for 
low paid jobs encourage the economically inactive to enter employment? Would more 
competitive firms pick up the market share and employ the laid off labour from firms 
forced out of business by the minimum rate? How far would employers who were forced 
to pay more find it worthwhile to invest more in training and equipment to raise their 
labour’s productivity? How far would they be managerially capable of responding in this 
way? Would a pressure to reassert pay differentials within firms dramatically amplify the 
labour cost consequences of the introduction of a minimum wage? Would the inflationary 
implications of such a response prompt the Monetary Policy Committee to take pre-
emptive measures on interest rates that would themselves increase unemployment? How 
far would a minimum wage discriminate against young workers? It was evident that there 
would be no straight-forward answer to any of these big questions. The answers would 
vary substantially by sector, as well as by the phase in the business cycle.   
 
Consultation 
The Commission quickly decided that their best way of gaining insights on these 
questions was by going out and meeting the data. That is, that only by talking to the low 
payers and the low paid at their workplaces could they gain a rounded view of the salient 
issues sector by sector. They therefore embarked upon, and continue to maintain, a 
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programme of day trips, sometimes incorporating over-night stays and routine 
Commission meetings, throughout the United Kingdom. During the course of these, two 
or three Commissioners, accompanied by one or two secretariat members, might, for 
example, meet a group of care home owners, visit a sausage factory, visit a motorway 
service station, and meet a group concerned with placing people with disabilities in 
employment. Particular efforts were made to talk to examples of firms where difficulties 
with the Minimum Wage were expected or reported. But it was also helpful to meet 
examples of employers in vulnerable sectors for whom the Minimum Wage offered no 
challenge. It became evident early on that, especially among small firms, a dependence 
on low pay rates as a means of competition is often associated with very poor labour 
management. 
 
Initially the Commission’s consultations, whatever the sector, were concerned with a 
fairly long check-list of questions. These included: the composition of the pay-packet for 
the low paid; the nature and sensitivity of any incentive schemes; the use of overtime; 
who would benefit and how much they would gain; possible knock-on effects on 
differentials; training potential; scope for improving productivity through better 
equipment; labour turnover; and recruitment problems. Then there were questions 
specific to particular sectors, such as those concerned with casual labour in agriculture, 
tipping in restaurants, subsidised accommodation in hotels, staff discounts in retailing, 
and overseas competition in clothing. A fruitful opening to a discussion of enforcement 
was often to ask what methods the firm thought that its rivals might use to cheat on the 
Minimum Wage. And it was always interesting to ask how firms might cope, if at all, 
with a selection of possible Minimum Wage rates. 
 
Once the Minimum Wage had become law the issues discussed shifted to how firms were 
actually coping with it and how it had changed their labour market. A number of sectors 
raised complaints that were discussed in situ and in some cases led to changes in the 
regulations and in some cases led to changes in firms payment procedures. For example, 
exceptions were made to exclude people who receive ‘pocket money’ while staying in 
religious communities. But they were not made for the young people who act as 
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supervisors at ‘activity holiday’ camps, largely in return for bed and board. Later still the 
emphasis of consultation has shifted to some of the more difficult issues to do with 
enforcement in, for example, the ‘black economy’, and among ethnic communities where 
language barriers and other disadvantages may create market aberrations. 
 
Enforcement has been a central issue from the start. The great majority of workers likely 
to be affected by the Minimum Wage are in private services which, though intensely 
competitive domestically, are unaffected by foreign competition. What matters to law-
abiding firms in these sectors is that none of their rivals should gain a competitive cost 
advantage by cheating on the Minimum Wage. Employers have generally had very little 
objection in principle to the idea of a statutory minimum. Many sectors had relatively 
recent benign experience of it under Wages Councils. Those that had not, such as 
security, care homes, and industrial cleaning, could see benefits in some order being 
brought to their labour markets. The main concerns that those employers who were 
affected expressed to the Commission were, first, that the level of the rate should be 
manageable and, second, that their domestic competitors should be forced to comply. 
 
The Commission’s programme of consultation has had an important political as well as 
informative function. So far as external relations have been concerned, it has been of 
inestimable value that national representatives of many interest groups have known that 
Commissioners have made an effort to meet their grass-roots members and to understand 
the complexities of their complaints. Itineraries have been planned with the assistance of 
organisations such as Citizens Advice Bureaux, Chambers of Commerce, Low Pay Units, 
and the Federation of Small Business, each suggesting interviews to make particular, 
valuable, points. The visits have enlivened the Commission’s continuing dialogue with 
those affected by the Minimum Wage.  
 
Perhaps less obvious has been the effect of the consultation process upon relations within 
the Commission. The richness of experience associated with interviewing the low payers 
and low paid on their home ground established a vivid and shared set of reference points 
on a myriad of aspects of the Minimum Wage. The visits, and subsequent discussion of 
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them among Commissioners, have done more than anything else to increase 
understanding of the complexity of the low pay problem and to prevent simple 
stereotyping. It should also be acknowledged that there has been a significant emotional 
contribution from many visits. From first-hand accounts by, for example, home-workers, 
multiple job-holding cleaners, and sweat-shop employees, Commissioners have gained an 
acute awareness of the utter vulnerability of so many people at the bottom of an 
unregulated labour market. The experience has undoubtedly increased their determination 
to make the National Minimum Wage work. 
 
Another aspect of consultation was within what might be broadly described as 
government. Quite apart from the usual network of communication between officials 
characteristic of the Civil Service, Commissioners themselves met relevant bodies to 
share views and pre-empt misunderstandings. One important meeting, just after the 
publication of the Commission’s First Report, was with the Bank of England’s Monetary 
Policy Committee. This gave a chance for Commission members to discuss the reasoning 
behind their recommendations and, in particular, their view that the introduction of the 
National Minimum Wage would have minimal ‘knock-on’ effects on the economy 
through attempts to restore pay differentials. Later, another presentation to the MPC 
provided an opportunity to discuss evidence on the actual impact of the Wage. Useful 
meetings were held later on with senior Treasury officials on the relationship between the 
National Minimum Wage and the broader tax and benefit strategy. Statistical problems 
and requirements were discussed at meetings with senior officials of the Office of 
National Statistics (ONS). Although there was never any question of seeking Government 
approval for the Commission’s decisions, it helped for the Chair of the Commission to 
make the relevant case in person to the Secretary of State or Prime Minister when reports 
were submitted. From the start and at all levels, the Commission has gone out of its way 
to talk to people in its efforts to avoid misunderstanding. Partly as a result, the 




As well as its visits, the Commission also built up a substantial programme of more 
conventional research (LPC, 2000b). A relatively small but important part was carried out 
‘in house’. A ‘before and after’ postal survey was conducted of several thousand small 
employers in affected sectors with the help of trade associations. This was particularly 
helpful in obtaining information on the way that businesses had met the shock to their 
costs of paying the Minimum Wage. Otherwise, the relatively few months within which 
the First Report had to be produced provided little opportunity for research in anticipation 
of the Wage. But considerable thought was given to research on the manner in which the 
Wage then impacted upon firms, workers and the economy, and each subsequent report 
has been informed by around twenty specially commissioned projects typically costing 
just a few thousand pounds each. Some of these have been carried out by groups with 
unique access to the low paid, such as Citizens Advice Bureaux and Low Pay Units. 
Some work has been done by labour market consultancy firms with their specialised 
surveying experience. Much has been done by academics with expert knowledge of 
particular sectors and statistical sources. The Commission deliberately encouraged a wide 
variety of research methodologies, from case studies and observation through to 
simulation and complex statistical analysis, and some of Britain’s outstanding labour 
market scholars have produced seminal studies as a result. The ‘natural experiment’ 
aspect of introducing a minimum wage has been very fruitfully exploited. 
 
There was, however, one vital area of information that was seriously defective, and the 
gravity of its defects became increasingly apparent as the Commission’s work 
progressed. The official statistics on earnings, upon which were based all estimates of the 
number of people affected by and the cost of the National Minimum Wage, were 
inadequate. Britain has two main regular sources of earnings data. The annual New 
Earnings Survey (NES) samples from the payroll records of employees who pay income 
tax by PAYE. It was devised in the 1960s when incomes policies focussed attention on 
the more unionised sectors of the workforce. It is accurate so far as the pay and hours of 
those sampled, but misses many low-paid employees, particularly young people and part-
timers, who do not pay tax, and thus understates the low paid. The other source is the 
rolling Labour Force Survey (LFS), which relies on the recollections of interviewees on 
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the doorstep (or of their partners) on a wide range of labour market characteristics. 
Interviewees’ accounts of earnings are often vague, and since they tend to overstate their 
hours, the LFS tends to under-calculate low pay in hourly earnings terms. Aware of these 
broad defects, but unable to assess the more unsystematic biases, the ONS produced a 
Central Estimate of the two series (ONS, 1998). But since for the low paid this was, to 
put it crudely, the average of two incorrect series, it provided a poor source of guidance. 
The Commission pressed a receptive ONS to remedy the faults in these vital sources 
(LPC, 1999). This contributed to bringing about a general review of labour market 
statistics (ONS, 2002), but for the foreseeable future representative statistical knowledge 
of low pay remains very inadequate. 
 
Meanwhile, the Commissioners had to deal with the difficulty that they were, in effect, 
sailing with an ever-changing statistical chart as the ONS endeavoured to sharpen up its 
Central Estimate series. They decided to adopt a policy of complete candour, and to 
revise their estimates in the light of the best available data. Thus the First Report 
predicted that ‘around two million people’ would benefit immediately from the National 
Minimum Wage (LPC, 1998: 5). The Second Report had to revise this to ‘well over 1.5 
million workers were entitled to higher pay’ (LPC, 2000a; 16). By their Third Report, 
after further discussion of the vagaries of the official data sources, they concluded that 
‘workers in around 1.3 million jobs were entitled to higher pay’ (LPC, 2001; 22). Perhaps 
because of the policy of candour, perhaps because the revisions have been downwards, 
there has been little adverse criticism of the Commission arising from these wayward 
data.  
 
Principles and practice 
Two of the guiding principles that the Commission steered by have already been 
discussed: widespread consultation and careful research. Another one adopted early was 
‘keep it simple’: the view that any avoidable complications would impede understanding 
of and compliance with the National Minimum Wage. This applied particularly to the 
technically complex task of defining the Wage. Whether, that is, it should include 
overtime, shift payments, pension contributions, bonuses, piecework earnings, tips, 
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accommodation allowances, subsidised meals, and so on. The visits proved invaluable in 
hammering out these issues. It emerged, for example, that the very low paid rarely benefit 
from additional payments, and that for most, being part-time workers, overtime is 
unknown. Simplicity of definition has proved robust in practice. 
 
A far more contentious issue was that of whether young workers should have a lower 
Minimum Wage rate than ‘adult’ workers. A complexity of political and statistical issues 
generated considerable difficulties within the Commission. The Government’s evidence 
made clear its concern that the National Minimum Wage should not jeopardise its 
objective of reducing youth unemployment. It pointed to research that showed not only 
that young people were more vulnerable to being unemployed than older people, but also 
that their life-chances were more damaged by unemployment. It also emphasised the 
evidence from other countries that sometimes showed minimum wages having adverse 
employment consequences for young people. The TUC was firmly of the view that there 
should be no discrimination in pay by age for workers of 18 or over doing the same job. 
Its major affiliated unions were bound by conference resolutions to this effect. Employers 
pointed out that, in practice, use of age-for-wage scales was rapidly diminishing, but also 
that on average young workers’ earnings do rise steeply towards the overall average from 
the mid-teens to the early twenties. The Commission’s statisticians were to show that 
much of this age effect did not reflect employer practice as such, but the fact that young 
people migrate into better-paid sectors as they grow older. There was endless scope for 
debate as to whether young workers’ low pay reflected lower productivity, or 
inexperience, or employer prejudice, or lack of training, or job searching, and so on. But 
that did not resolve the disagreement within the Commission. 
 
In the end it was resolved by a creative compromise. There was general agreement that 
low pay was often associated with inadequate training and, indeed, that Britain is deeply 
inadequate in its provision of training in basic skills, especially to young people leaving 
full-time education at 16. Several Commissioners were directly involved with training 
policy issues. It was also agreed that the National Minimum Wage should not act as a 
disincentive, and could act as a positive incentive, to the provision of training in basic 
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skills at all ages. Particular thought was given to the women re-entering the labour force 
in part-time employment who make up a high proportion of the low paid. It was therefore 
agreed that a lower rate of the National Minimum Wage could be proposed, and that this 
less-than-full rate, called a Development Rate, would apply to all 18 to 20 year olds, and 
also to workers over 20 on accredited training courses for the first six months in a new 
job with a new employer. The Government was to accept the formula, but has, up to the 
time of writing, remained adamant that the cut-off age should be the 22nd, and not the 
recommended, and more customary, 21st birthday. It should be noted that, in practice, 
there has been little use of the Development Rate for over 21 year olds. That probably 
partly reflects a paucity of relevant accredited training schemes. 
 
The question that has dominated popular attention has, understandably, been that of the 
level of the full National Minimum Wage rate. It was noted earlier that the Commission 
resolved this by a round-the-table bargain, but it was an unusual bargain. For a start, the 
Commissioners were agreed that they would approach it by what they came to refer to as 
‘triangulation’. That is, they would take into account a number of different pointers to the 
appropriate level, and test and discuss each one in turn. These included international 
comparisons of established minimum wage rates, measured in various ways. What, for 
example, was a reasonable ‘bite’, or proportion of the workforce to be directly affected? 
What percentage of the median wage was characteristic of minimum wages in other 
countries? How rapidly might a plausible percentage be approached? What has been 
happening, and can be expected to happen, to the shape of the UK’s earnings 
distribution? Where would Wages Council rates have arrived at if they had not been 
abolished in 1993?  
 
Effective use of these pointers relied upon good information on the present earnings 
distribution, and it is a reasonable question whether the Commission’s recommendation 
on the initial level of the National Minimum Wage would have been different if they had 
known in 1998 what they were to come to learn by 2001 about the problems of the 
national earnings statistics. Speculation is of little value, but it is arguable that it would 
have made little difference. This is partly because some Commissioners were less 
 15
impressed than others by statistical wizardry. Most had substantial bargaining experience 
and had acquired the scepticism that brings. But probably more important was that 
Commissioners were acutely aware of what they had learned, very tangibly through the 
consultative process, about what was being paid and what it was judged different sorts of 
firms could live with. The written evidence from different interest groups and the 
consultation visits both contributed substantially to the final decision on the rate. 
 
An issue almost as important for many economists as the level of the Minimum Wage 
rate was the extent to which pushing up the floor of the national wage structure with a 
minimum would set off shock waves and knock-on effects, raising wages far above those 
of the low paid for whom the exercise was designed. Some macro-economic models that 
assumed substantial resilience of pay differentials produced hair-raising predictions of 
inflationary effects and consequent increased unemployment. The more the Commission 
investigated this, the less it bothered them. The vast majority of those likely to be 
affected by the National Minimum Wage were in non-unionised organisations, so trade 
union pressure was unlikely to be an issue. Affected firms were typically either very 
small, or characterised by flat hierarchies. Visits suggested that employers who had to 
raise the rates of their lowly paid employees might also think it sensible to add a little, 
less than pro rata, to their supervisors’ pay, but they saw no reason to do anything higher 
up than that. On this, as on many other aspects of predicting the impact of the Wage, in 
the end the only thing to do was to wait and see what happened. 
 
After implementation 
One of the attractions of recommending the first week in April 1999 as the appropriate 
date for the introduction of the National Minimum Wage was that the annual New 
Earnings Survey was due the week afterwards. The immediate impact of the legislation 
on earnings would be captured with remarkable accuracy. It need hardly be said that the 
Commissioners awaited the early results of this, and of the Labour Force Survey, and of a 
battery of other economic indicators, with considerable interest. Were their 
recommendations well-informed, or would there be widespread non-compliance, a wave 
of lay-offs, or an inflationary surge? 
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The National Minimum Wage was born at a very propitious economic juncture. Inflation 
was low, unemployment was low, and the economy was growing at a historically high 
rate. The larger of the sectors most affected by the Wage, such as retail, hospitality, and 
business services, were booming. During the rest of 1999 and over the following year, it 
gradually emerged that the best hopes for the Wage were being fulfilled. There was 
widespread awareness of it, and apparently substantial compliance with it, and the 
enforcement mechanism appeared to be active and effective (Inland Revenue/DTI, 2001). 
Whatever the number of the beneficiaries, it was substantial, and their earnings had 
increased by an initial surge of on average of over twenty per cent. But there had been 
minimal knock-on up the pay structure through restoration of differentials – it was 
negligible above the fifth percentile. There was no perceptible overall increase in prices, 
even at sectoral level. Nor was there evidence of adverse employment effects. 
Unemployment continued to fall, and labour force participation increased, most notably 
for 18 to 21 year olds (LPC, 2000a; 2001a). The fortunate timing of the birth of National 
Minimum Wage has helped it to develop into a healthy baby. 
 
With the National Minimum Wage firmly established, the Commissioners turned their 
attention improving compliance and establishing principles for its periodic uprating. They 
proposed, in a Report published after the 2001 General Election, a biennial procedure, 
avoiding crude indexing formulae, but continuing the successful practices of widespread 
consultation and careful research (LPC, 2001b). As an exercise in social partnership, the 
Commission appears so far to have been successful, helped no doubt by the fact that it 
was dealing with a single issue. Its future success is likely to be judged by how astutely it 
can meet the challenges of a rapidly changing labour market, and in particular how it will 
cope with economic down-turns. It will also be judged by whether the National Minimum 
Wage will continue, as it has with so little controversy begun, to achieve improvements 
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